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OMEN AND WORK
ND THE CANADIAN
UMAN RIGHTS ACT

ary Jane Mossman and Julie Ramona Jai

After many months of debate, the federal legislation on
human rights became fully effective on March 1, 1978.
Part of the legislation, establishing a Canadian Human
Rights Commission, had been proclaimed in force
months earlier, in August 1977, but the Canadian
Human Rights Act became effective as a whole just over
a year ago. 1 The anti-discrimination provisions of the
Act apply to employees of federal institutions previously
outside the ambit of provincial human rights statutes,2
and, in the words of at least one commentator in early
1978, the federal Act had potential to "establish the
federal government as the leader in human rights
matters." 3
This paper is an assessment of the validity of this
assertion about the Act's potential having special regard
to discrimination against women in the workforce. The
first section of the paper is an outline of the major
provisions of the Act which affect the position of
working women. The second section is a theoretical
analysis of the legislation, focusing on limitations
inherent in the Act which result both from definitions of
discriminatory actions and from the choice of legal
remedies for women facing discriminatory behaviour at
work. The third section is a brief look at the operation of
the Canadian Human Rights Commission during its first
year of activity.
A. THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACT:
AN OVERVIEW
The purpose of the Act, as stated in s.2, is to give effect
to the principle that:
(a) every individual should have an
equal opportunity with other
individuals to make for himself or
herself the life that he or she is able and
wishes to have, consistent with his or
her duties and obligations as a member
of society, without being hindered in or
prevented from doing so by
discriminatory practices based on ...
sex or marital status ...
Part I of the Act defines discriminatory practices. S. 3
states that sex and marital status are, among ot!Jirs,
"prohibited grounds of discrimination". Discriminatory
practices are defined by ss.5-13. In relation to
employment, s.7 states
7. It is a discriminatory practice, directly
or indirectly,
(a) to refuse to employ or continue to
employ an individual, or
(b) in the course of employment, to
differentiate adversely in relation to
an employee, on a prohibited ground
of discrimination.
Subsequent sections of the Act prohibit advertising of
employment which expresses preferences based on
prohibited grounds of discrimination (s.8), exclusion
from membership in an employee organization on a
prohibited ground of discrimination (s.9) 4 and adopt~on
by an employer or employee organization of a policy or
agreement which tends to deprive an individual or class
of individuals of employment opportunities on a
prohibited ground of discrimination (s.10). S.11 of the
Act establishes that it is a discriminatory practice for an
employer to differentiate in wages paid to male and

female employees employed in the same establishment
who are performing work of equal value. S.14,
however, provides that there is no discriminatory
practice if
(a) any refusal, exclusion, expulsion,
suspension, limitation, specification or
preference in relation to any
employment is based on a bona fide
occupational requirement ...
Thus, since s.14 maybe used to justify employment
decisions which would otherwise constitute
discriminatory practices, the interpretation of s.14 is
critical to an assessment of the role of the Act in
eliminating discrimination against women in the
workforce.
Part II of the Act establishes the Canadian Human
Rights Commission (s.21), with responsibility for
administering the Act and for developing information
programs, research programs, and liaison with
provincial Human Rights Commissions. The
Commission may on application or on its own initiative
issue guidelines binding on the Commission and on any
human rights tribunal established under the Act
(s.22(2)) .6 Pursuant to s.15(2), the Commission may also
give advice and assistance in relation to special programs
designed to prevent or eliminate disadvantages suffered
by any group of individuals because of (among other
factors) sex or marital status, where the special programs
are designed to improve opportunities for the group. As
well, the Commission may recommend that federal
contracts include terms which prohibit diseriminatory
practices under the Act (s.19).
Part III contains the mechanism for implementing the
goals of the Act. The procedure requires the filing of a
complaint with the Commission by an individual or a
group having reasonable grounds for believing that a
person is engaging or has engaged in-a discriminatory
practice (s.32(1)). If the complaint is filed by someone
other than the victim of the discriminatory practice, the
Commission may refuse to deal with the complaint
unless the victim consents. (s.32(2)). Significantly,
however, where the Commission has reasonable
grounds for believing that an employer is engaging in a
discriminatory practice, the Commission may initiate a
complaint.7 (s.32(3)). The Commission is required to·
deal witn any complaint filed unless there has been a
failure to exhaust other grievance or review procedures
(s.33) (a) or, for example, the complaint is trivial,
frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith.
(s.33 (b )(iii)).
In dealing with complaints, the Commission may
appoint an investigator (s.35) 8 who must submit a report
to the Commission. The Commission may adopt the
report or dismiss the complaint (s.36). In the event that
the complaint has not been settled during the
investigation, or dismissed,9 the Commission may
appoint a conciliator "for the purpose of attempting to
bring about a settlement of the complaint" (s.37(1)).
Terms of settlement may be referred to the Commission
for approval or rejection (s.38).
S.39 permits the Commission to appoint a Human
Rights Tribunal at any stage after the filing of a
complaint. 10 The tribunal must notify the Commission,
the complainant and the person against whom the
complaint was made (and any other person, in its

discretion) of its investigation of the complaint, and
must give an opportunity of appearing before the
tribunal, presenting evidence, and making
representations, to all persons notified (s.40). S.41
provides that at the conclusion of its inquiry, the
tribunal may make an appropriate order, including
cessation of a discriminatory practice, and restriction of
rights or compensation to the victim of the
discriminatory practice. 11
S.45 prohibits intimidation or discrimination against
anyone who makes a complaint under the Act. Further,
s.46 provides for fines of up to $10,000 for an employer
or employee organization guilty of an offence under the
Act; it is an offence to fail to comply with the terms of
any settlement of a complaint, to obstruct a tribunal or
an investigator, to reduce wages in order to eliminate
discrimination, or to contravene s.45.
This overview of the legislation indicates that the
primary focus of the Act is the resolution of individual
cases of discrimination. The Act provides the means of
investigating complaints and for negotiation and
settlement where complaints are well-founded. There
are also provisions for levying fines where there is an
· offence under the Act, and the Commission has
responsibilities for educating the public on issues of
discrimination. Although in some ways the federal
legislation may provide greater protection against
discrimination than the provincial Acts, the overall
pattern of the federal Act is similar to that adopted by·
most of the provinces in Canada. 12 The essential issue is
whether this form of legislation can effectively curtail o
prevent discriminatory practices in relation to women i
the workforce.
B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ACT
(1) Justifiable Discrimination: The Bona Fide
Occupational Requirement
The interpretation of the Act's provisions prohibitin~
discriminatory practices is the key to the quality of
protection against discrimination for working women.
Clearly, a broad interpretation of the discriminatory
practices defined in ss. 7 -11 of the Act by the
Commission will provide more opportunities for
complaints to the Commission, and the possibility that
the Commission's intervention will eliminate
discriminatory practices. However, a very significant
provision in this Part of the Act is s.14, the section whi1
permits an employer to justify an existing
discriminatory practice on the basis of a bona fide
occupational requirement. An employer who can
demonstrate that being male is a bona fide occupational
requirement may continue a practice of employing on!
male workers in particular job categories. Although th
onus is on the employer to show entitlement to s.14 as
defence to a charge of discrimination, an examination
the interpretation of this phrase in similar statutes
detracts from the efficacy of the newfederal Act as a
means of protecting women from discrimination in
employment.
From a conceptual point of view, the bona fide
occupational requirement can be criticized as an
unnecessary part of the legislation. Since there is no
suggestion that the Act's intent is to compel an emplo:
to hire or promote an employee who is unqualified foi
job or promotion, it is arguable that the explicit refere
to a bona fide occupational requirement is superfluous
2

significantly, however, it creates an exception
h may tend in practice to perpetuate myths about
propriateness of certain kinds of work for female
yees, and encourage sex-stereotyping. An
ican commentator 13 has also suggested that the
presence of a bona fide occupational requirement
impede the investigation of complaints about sex
imination by the members of an enforcement
cy itself; it may encourage them to continue to view
en as a stereotyped class rather than to focus on the
ic abilities of the individual complainant.
.wever, despite these objections, all14 Canadian
inces include the bona fide occupational requirement
exception to discriminatory practices in their
an rights legislation. Overall, the requirement has
ally been narrowly construed so that it has
eded only where convincing evidence was
ced to show that all persons of one sex were
able of performing the job or whether it was
sary to accommodate considerations of public
ncy. 15 Moreover, because s.14 is regarded as a
ification for practices which would otherwise be
. ibited as discriminatory, the onus is on the
layer to establish that a bona fide occupational
irement exists. 16
roblems relating to the definition of the bona fide
upational requirement are well-illustrated in the
isions of American courts. Like the Canadian Act, the
erican legislation 17 designates certain employment
ctices unlawful if they are based on discrimination
ause of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 18
wever, s.703(e) provides that an employer (or others)
not commit an unlawful employment practice
in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or
enterprise ...
he cases which interpret the bona fide occupational
alification are not entirely consistent in the reasoning
hey adopt. For example, in Weeks v. Southern Bell
elephone and Telegraph Co. 19 Bell gave evidence of its
lief that the job of switchman was too onerous for
women; however, Bell failed fo show that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform the
tasks involved, and consequently the Court held that
they were unable to claim that being male was a bona fide
occupational requirement. However, the test used
focused on the general characteristics of women as a
group, and not the individual abilities of particular
women. Thus, despite the apparent success of the
complainant in Weeks, the test adopted in reaching the
decision possessed inherent possibilities of sexstereotyping.
Sex-stereotyping may also occur if the test adopted
takes into account "the prevailing views in society"
about women in the workforce. In Fogg v. New England
Tel. and Tel. Co., 20 the basis of the complaint was a
denial of promotion to a woman in a company where
almost no positions in senior management were held by
women. The court accepted that the company's practice
of delegating women to junior positions reflected "the
mores and standards" of our society rather than
conscious policy of sex-discrimination. The effect is a

justification of maleness as a bona fide occupational
requirement according to prevailing societal views about
appropriate work for women. Interestingly, in Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways Inc.,21 the prevailing
view about women's work, as an appropriate criterion
for employment decisions, was rejected. In that case, a
male applicant for a job as a flight attendant complained
of discrimination when the airline refused to hire him
because its customers preferred females, and because of
its view that the psychological needs of passengers were
better served by females. The company's decision was
upheld at trial, but reversed by the Court of Appeal,
which stated that customer preference and convenience
did not justify femaleness as a bona fide occupational
requirement in the circumstances. The Court of Appeal
did indicate, however, that the position might be altered
if the airline were able to demonstrate that the essence of
its business operation would be undermined. However,
while this decision rejected prevailing societal views in
the application of the test of bona fide occupational
requirement, it nevertheless again focused on the general ·
qualities of males and females as groups rather than the
individual qualities of particular men and women .
The problem of "neutral" job requirements resulting
in indirect discrimination also presents difficulties. 22 In
Gera v. New York Pennsylvania Pro Baseball Club, 23 a
female applicant for the job of professional referee was
successful in establishing discrimination because the
employer failed to prove that being male was a bona fide
occupational requirement or that the height and weight
requirements were job-related. In Berni, 24 however, a
woman police officer failed in a complaint of
discrimination regarc\ing her failure to be promoted to
the position of sergeant. The employer alleged that there
were no women sergeants on the force because there
were no patrol-women with sufficient experience for
promotion, despite the fact that women were not given
assignments from which they might acquire the
necessary experience. In a similar case in Nova Scotia,
Ryan v. Town of North Sydney, 25 a woman applicant
was denied a job as a police officer completely, on the
assumption that she would have been unable to work
the night shift. Although the tribunal found insufficient
facts to prove discrimination in that case, one can
speculate whether the prevailing views of the inability of
women in general to work a night shift might have
justified the employer's decision on the basis of a bona
fide occupational requirement.
In view of the inherent difficulties in applying a test of
bona fide occupational requirement, the Advisory
Council on the Status of Women recommended that the
requirement should be restrictively interpreted, and that
the situations to which it applied should be "few, clear,
and precise." 26 More specifically, the Council
recommended that no bona fide occupational
requirement should be used if it was based on
assumptions about the abilities of women in general, .
rather than qualities of individual women. The Council
also recommended that no employer should be entitled
to refuse to hire on account of the preferences of coworkers, clients, customers, or the employer, but that in
cases where a female is genuinely required (such as an
actress for a female stage role) sex could be a bona fide
occupational requirement.
•
These guidelines are quite similar to those adopted by
3

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in the United States. 27 The EEOC guidelines also
provide for a narrow interpretation of the bona fide
occupational qualification exception in relation to
matters of sex discrimination. In particular, the
guidelines state that the Commission will find the
exception unwarranted where there is a refusal to hire
because of sex based on assumptions of the comparative
employment characteristics of women in general (such
as an assumption of a high turnover rate among
women); where there is a refusal to hire based on
stereotyped characteristics of the sexes (such as
assumptions that men are less capable of assembling
intricate equipment or that women are less capable of
aggressive selling); and where the refusal to hire is based
on preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients or
customers, except in cases requiring employees to be
male or female for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness.
The presence of s.14 in the Canadian Human Rights
Act presents a challenge for the Commission. By
narrowly construing the ambit of a bona fide
occupational requirement, the Commission will enhance
job opportunities for women in non-traditional work.
However, in deciding whether discriminatory action
based on occupational requirements is justified in
particular cases, the Commission's interpretation of s.14
clearly involves more than a mechanical application of a
statutory formula. A decision whether s.14 applies to
justify discriminatory behaviour involves attitudes and
ideas about the roles of men and women in society at
large as well as in the workplace and in the particular job
concerned. Moreover, the decision also invites
consideration of the usefulness of interference with the
choice of personnel by private employers, and may
invoke concern about the efficacy of "reverse
discrimination." Thus s.14 is very significant not only
because its interpretation will have immediate
repercussions in the workforce and the job opportunities
which may be available to women; in addition, s.14
implicitly embodies unformulated ideas about the
proper sphere for women in the workforce, leaving it to
the tribunals established by the Commission to decide on
a case-by-case basis whether decisions of employers
reflect discrimination or merely occupational
requirements." The point is that ideas about what work
should be done by women (and by men) form a
fundamental part of our social structure so that
decisions about the application of s.14 must always
reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, the subjective social
context in which they are made. The Commission's task
is a difficult one because its ideas about appropriate jobs
for women may differ substantially from those of
employers, and because a decision by a Human Rights
Tribunal that an employer may not rely on s.14 will in
all likelihood require a very substantial reorganization of
job structures within a particular workplace. To apply
s.14 as the Advisory Council suggested would result in a
fundamental restructuring of jobs in the Canadian
workforce.
The implications of s.14 for fundamental change in the
structure of employment raises the major philosophical
issues in connection with the Act. This issue is whether
the Act is directed primarily to amelioration of the most
glaring instances of sex discrimination in employment,
or whether the Act is designed to effect a major

restructuring of the workforce so that men and women
may have equal opportunities in their work. While this
issue is of some significance in relation to the
interpretation of s.14, it is critically important to the
enforcement procedures of the Act, and its analysis in
the context of enforcement highlights a major difficulty
with the legislation.
(2) Enforcing the Act: Individual Initiative and
Voluntary Compliance
Human rights legislation is generally directed at
changing attitudes about discrimination and enforcing
behaviour which is non-discriminatory. However, it is
of some significance to determine whether the primary
focus of legislation is changing attitudes or enforcing a
code of behaviour, and there is an ongoing debate about
the comparative effectiveness of Acts directed to each of
these purposes. On the one hand, changing attitudes
about discrimination through information and
education programs can result in equality of opportunit
by consensus, although the educative process may be a
very long-term one. By contrast, legislating to prohibit
discriminatory behaviour has much more immediate
and obviqus effects, even though compelling nondiscriminatory behaviour may not result in any change
in attitudes. Indeed, compelling employers to act
without discrimination against women may actually
entrench discriminatory attitudes despite conformity
with legislative requirements. Legislation which has as
its primary focus changing discriminatory attitudes
through education programs reflects a view that
discrimination can be curtailed or eliminated through
awareness and understanding of the issue; it assumes
that employers discriminate against women without
being aware of the implications of their actions. By
contrast, the underlying premise of legislation which, <
its primary goal, compels non-discriminatory behavi01
is that employers may choose to discriminate on the
basis of sex in employment decisions because it is mon
advantageous to them; in this context, changing
attitudes alone will not be sufficient.
This latter view accords with a view of sex
discrimination as a structural or systemic problem of
society. It assumes that the position of women in the
workforce is related to economic and social forces whi
shape the roles available to men and women, not
according to the abilities of individuals, but because o~
the needs of the workforce and of the goals of employ1
Advocates of this view assert that only by legislating
changes in behaviour will effective changes in warner
work occur. Of course, such legislation requires a
substantial interference with the organization of the
workforce and may result in considerable disruption
employers. Not surprisingly, such legislation needs tc
carefully drawn and thoughtful preparation for its
introduction may be essential.

/1

The Canadian Human Rights Act is designed to af
women's roles in the workforce both by means of
_changing attitudes and also by compelling nondiscriminatory behaviour on the part of employers. I
powers to conduct research and information progra1
and to advise in relation to the adoption of special
programs for disadvantaged groups, are clearly desi~
to increase awareness of and influence attitudes abo1
human rights. At the same time, its powers to invest
and hear complaints and to make recommendations
4

act compliance" emphasize the Commission's role
rcing non-discriminatory behaviour. Moreover,
a.ls of changing attitudes on one hand and
ling non-discriminatory behaviour on the other
t mutually exclusive. Publicity about a hearing
a Human Rights Tribunal may generate
ness of human rights issues most effectively, so
ompelling non-discriminatory behaviour in
'on to one employer may have educative effects for
mmunity at large.
ever, an effective challenge to structural
'mination against working women requires a
ry legislative focus on changes in behaviour;
ural discrimination is notthe result of a lack of
eness but rather of a choice of priorities which
rages continued discrimination against working
n. To overcome structural discrimination against
king women, the Commission must emphasize its
ers to compel non-discriminatory behaviour among
foyers; effective change cannot occur through
cation alone.

augmented by the educative role of the Commission. For

~xample,.s.22 authorizes the Commission to develop

mfo~~at10n programs and to "endeavour by persuasion,
pubhc1ty, or any other means that it considers
appr~priate" to discourage and reduce discriminatory
pra~tlces. Pursuant to s.15, the Commission may also
advise employers in relation to the adoption of
voluntary programs of affirmative action in relation to
certain employees including those discriminated against
on the ?~sis of sex._ T~ese provisions obviously reflect a
rec?gmtion that ehmm?tmg discrimination may require
action.on? b~o~der basis than can be achieved by
resolving md1v1dual complaints.
~verall, the Act provides a wide range of measures
which may be adopted by the Commission or its
tribun.als to eliminate discriminatory attitudes and
behaviour. However, it is essential to recognize that
equal opportunity for working women cannot be
achieved by education programs and complaints
procedures dependent on victim-initiation. Such
measures have had little effect in relation to sex
discrimination in the past. For example, in 1967 the
federal public service prohibited sex discrimination. Yet
a study of the public service in 197033 indicated that
women in the public service were still concentrated in
low-paid and low-responsibility jobs, with shorter
career ladders, and frequently classified to prevent
sideways movement. In a similar study of the Toronto
legal profession in 1971, 34 40% of Toronto law firms
openly admitted to a prejudicial attitude to women
applicants for employment. The Ontario Human Rights
Code was amended in 1971 to include" sex" and
"marital status" as prohibited grounds of discrimination
and sex discrimination was prohibited by the Codes of
both the Canadian Bar Association and the Law Society
of Upper Canada. However, a report in late 1978
indicated widespread discrimination on the basis of sex
in the Ontario legal profession. 35 In such a context, the
efficacy of measures which depend primarily on a
victim-initiated complaint process, and voluntary
compliance and educational procedures, must be called
into question.
There are also examples outside Canada. Theyecent
report of the Equal Opportunities Commission in the
United Kingdom 36 indicates that there is "clearly a long
way to go before equality between the sexes is achieved
in the workplace." 37 The report is based on a study
conducted by the Commission to examine the
effectiveness of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. The
study indicates that the majority of industrial employers
have taken formal steps to ensure avoidance of unlawful
discrimination pursuant to the Act. Significantly,
however, only 10% of employers had taken more
positive action and conducted an analysis of their
workforce (by sex and job category, pay level, etc.) to
examine the status of women in their organization;
moreover, only 2% had taken more specific action to
create equal opportunities for women workers. Inthis
latter category, one company had adopted a
comprehensive analysis and monitoring system in
relation to their employees; significantly, in the last four
years, this company showed a 115% (from 41 to 89)
increase in the number of women in middle and senior
management grades. The Commission also noted a
number of approaches to the EOC for guidance on

.he Canadian Human Rights Act relies substantially
a complaints mechanism initiated by the victim of
rimination. Yet substantial reliance on individual
plaints of sex discrimination to trigger the complaint
edures poses a number of problems. The
plainant must first recognize that discrimination on
basis of sex has occurred; interestingly, this may
It in a failure to detect employers who adopt very
tie forms of discrimination. 28 This point was wellmented by Leon Mayhew 29 in a study of racial
crimination, in which he noted the inappropriateness
.a process relying on individual complaints of
'scrimination in relation to middle and senior
nagement positions. Promotion to these positions
nerally depends, at least in part, on a colleageal
lationship, which would usually be destroyed by
dging a complaint of sex discrimination. Moreover,
ayhew also suggested that complaints may be seen to
ve less likelihood of success where the employer is a
ry large or strategic concern, and the process may
ever be triggered at all in relation to these employers.
he overall effect of these criticisms of the complaint
rocess is an inconsistent and piecemeal enforcement of
the Act. 30
The enforcement provisions of the Act also adopt the
norm of the provincial Acts in providing for conciliation
and negotiation with employers against whom
complaints are lodged. As has been suggested
frequently, 31 there is a potential danger that acts of
·discrimination by employers will be tolerated by the
bargaining process. In view of the practical difficulties
faced by a victim of sex discrimination who lodges a
complaint but remains in the workplace, the prospect
that her complaint may not result in any real sanction
against the employer is another deterrent to the effective
operation of the enforcement mechanisms of the Act.
However, the Act does not rely solely on individual
complaints to enforce its provisions; the Commission
may also initiate complaints under the Act, although
effective use of these powers may well require
investigative resources beyond its capacity. 32 In addition,
the Commission may recommend contract compliance
pursuant to s.19 and a tribunal may order affirmative
action by an employer. These enforcement powers are
5

developing policy to enhance equal opportunities for
working women. However, overall, the change in
employment practices was negligible, particularly in
relation to job segregation, recruitment and training,
and promotion.
Despite these conclusions, the Commission's report is
generally positive. In particular, it ends with the
statement that:
... it is important that those in industry
take part in the discussion on equality of
opportunity, since in due course the
Commission's guidance publications
will be worked into Statutory Codes of
practice, over which of course the fullest
prior consultation will take place. 38
It is obvious that the Commission views the achievement
of equality of opportunity for working women as a long
term goal, and its achievements to this point as small,
but significant, steps along the way. Undoubtedly, the
education of public opinion, as well as industrial
employers, is a very long term process. In view of
experiences elsewhere, however, one might well
question whether the long term goal can ever be effected
by voluntary measures for creating equal opportunity.
Indeed, the final paragraph of the Commission's report
suggests that more coercive measures will be required in
the future. The accomplishments of the UK Commission
after three years may be an indication of what can be
expected from the Canadian Commission after a similar
period of operation. The critical question is whether it is
enough.
Some years ago, the answer to this question in the
United States was a resounding no. Originally, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made sex a prohibited
ground of discrimination and established a complaint
procedure before the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission with power to attempt settlements. The
complainant or the Attorney/Ceneral (and since 1972,
the EEOC) could also initiaye civil action, and could
obtain injunctions, ordersfor re-instatement or backpay, etc. However, since 1968, recognizing the need for a
broader-based approach to the problem, Congress
granted the power to the EEOC to conduct industrywide investigations to deal with sex discrimination. The
celebrated case involving American Tel. and Tel. Co.
resulted from one such investigation. 39 Thus, exercising
its authority and resources to initiate investigations
rather than depending on the individual complaint
mechanism, 40 the EEOC has effected a very substantial
change in the opportunities for women workers
at AT&T.
Interestingly, equal employment opportunities were
also enhanced in the U.S. A. by an altogether different
technique. From 1965, Presidential Executive Orders
instituted contract compliance requirements for all
government contracts with companies of more than fifty
employees or whether the value of the contract exceeded
$50,000. 41 The requirement included the adoption of
affirmative action programs and was monitored by the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance. The penalty for
failure to comply was the severance of contractual
relations; in addition, the Secretary of Labor was
empowered to publish names of uncooperative
companies or to recommend criminal proceedings or
Title VII actions. These measures, in particular, forced

behavioural change on employers, with or without
attitudinal change, and represent a clear departure from
measures which focus primarily on changing attitudes.
While s.19 in the Canadian Human Rights Act presents
a clear opportunity for a similar program in Canada, it is
less clear that the opportunity will be accepted.
Many commentators regard measures like those in the
U.S. A. to be necessary to provide equal opportunities
for working women. However, it is clear that the goal of
changing attitudes, assuming that it may also be
successful over a very much longer time span, is not
without its attraction. A society in which there is no
adverse discrimination because of a consensus that such
discrimination robs both individuals and society as a
whole of full potential is an excellent ideal. The danger
in opting for the elimination of discrimination by
changing attitudes alone, however, is that very little real
progress will occur, even over an extended period of
time. The focus on conciliation in the complaints
procedure may, at worst, result in little more than bandaid relief for the victim, and do little to change the ideas
of an employer about his or her discriminatory attitudes.
There is little stigma attached to discrimination and the
sanctions which may be imposed are not really
substantial (at least by comparison with the U.S. A. ),
even when they are actually levied. In the result, the Act
appears to regard discrimination as a problem, but not
one for which it is necessary to adopt firm and effective
procedures. By contrast, the invasion of property rights
in society is regarded as much more serious than the
interference with a female employee's opportunities
within the workforce. 42
Overall, the Canadian Human Rights Act may
deserve the accolade bestowed on it as the "leader in
human rights matters" in Canada, but this view should
not obscure the fact that the legislation does not, from a
theoretical perspective, provide a means for effectively
ensuring equal opportunities for women workers. 43 This
view by no means suggests that the Act is useless. On the
contrary, just as provincial human rights legislation has
contributed to an understanding of discrimination in the
workplace, the federal Commission will undoubtedly be
of some assistance. However, it is essential to understand
the limitations inherent in the legislative choices of the
Act, and to recognize that the goal of eliminating sex
discrimination in employment is unlikely to be wholly
achieved by the means adopted. More significantly, it is
essential to recognize this Act's limitations in order to
ensure that the Act will not be regarded as having solved
the problem of discrimination against women in the
workforce.
C. THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION: THE FIRST YEAR
In our first report, we committed
ourselves to use the tools of recourse,
awareness and advocacy to ensure that
the legislation that established the
Canadian Human Rights Commission
fulfilled its important purpose. The past
twelve months are crowded with
examples of our efforts to gain support
for our objectives by translating the
principle of equality of opportunity into
everyday experience. 44
6

This statement, from the Preface of the Commission's
NNUAL REPORT for 1978, indicated that initiatives
ere undertaken by the Commission to implement
rinciples of equality. The preface further indicated that
the Commission's work encompassed both "providing a
means of redressing individual complaints" and
"contributing to the process of attitudinal change."4s In
ddition, the ANNUAL REPORT clearly evidenced
oncern for structural discrimination. For example,
. 1though the Commission recognized that
discrimination may occur as a result of "intentional
bigotry" or "irrational prejudice", it also recognized that
some forms of discrimination required a different
explanation. 46

discrimination. In one case, 51 three women were fired by
a transportation company because of a company policy
with regard to women working on a road crew.
Although the foreman was satisfied with the work of
these employees, company policy prevented their
employment because of inadequate facilities for the
women; in fact, however, the foreman had made
arrangements for separate facilities in relation to this
particular crew. After investigation by the Commission,
a settlement was reached: the three complainants
received written apologies, compensation for lost income
and incidental expenses incurred as a result of the
termination, and offers of employment. 52 The company
also issued written instructions to all its departments
ordering compliance with the act.
The ANNUAL REPORT indicates that it received
several other complaints 53 about company policies
affecting the admission of women to the Armed Forces
and to amateur sports, and about height requirements
which effectively denied women access to employment.
A complaint about a denial of employment
opportunities by Bell Canada in fulfilling its contract
with Saudi Arabia was investigated by the Commission,
and conciliation was started. There were also complaints
about discrimination based on prejudice rather than
stated policy, and complaints about practices which
differentiated adversely against working mothers, in
areas such as maternity leave and benefits. The
Commission also reported that sexual harassment is "a
discriminatory barrier to the professional development
of women." 54
It is clear, however, from the ANNUAL REPORT that
the Commission's primary emphasis in handling
complaints was on conciliation to produce settlements.

We cannot therefore define
discrimination purely in terms of
behaviour motivated by evil intentions;
the definition has to include the impact
of whole systems on the lives of
individuals-what is called structural or
systemic discrimination. As well as
offering redress in isolated cases of
discrimination against specific
individuals, therefore, the Commission
must study employment systems and
social programs from the point of view
of their effect on certain groups ...
[where] a system established for some
other purpose ... operates to exclude
some people from opportunities that it
makes available to others. 47
These statements are of special importance in relation
to discrimination against working women since it is
clear that measures which affect structural barriers to
equal opportunity are needed in addition to those which
provide redress for individual complaints. However, an
assessment of the work of the Commission in its first
year, at least in relation to sex discrimination, indicates
small successes in relation to individual complaints
rather than effective change in relation to structural
barriers to equal opportunity for women. Moreover,
despite the existence of legislative provisions to compel
non-discriminatory behaviour, the primary emphasis of
the Commission's work in the sex discrimination area
has been on attitudinal and long-term change.
(1) Complaints and Compliance.
There were 2929 inquiries, complaints and requests
for referrals to the Canadian Human Rights Commission
in 1978. 48 However, only 164 were accepted for
investigation, and, of these, 26 were dismissed after
investigation and 10 withdrawn by the complainant;
only 11 were settled after investigation. 49 Since most of
the formal complaints, 117 in number, were still pending
at the end of December 1978, it is virtually impossible to
assess the effectiveness of the complaints procedure.
Moreover, the statistics do not indicate the number of
complaints related to sex discrimination, so a
comparison with other forms of discrimination is also
impossible. It is significant, however, that there is no
mention in the statistics of any complaints initiated by
the Commission itself (as permitted by the Act), so that
the complaints mechanism appears to have relied wholly
on victim-initiation.so
The ANNUAL REPORT contained some examples of
complaints to the Commission based on sex

The human rights officer assigned to
investigate the formal complaint takes
the initial approach that the
complainant is seeking help with a
problem, and that he or she will
cooperate in providing all possible
evidence to get to the truth of the
matter. The investigator also assumes
that the person or organization
complained of ... is not intentionally
discriminating, and will want to
cooperate fully with the investigation.ss
To protect this spirit of cooperation, information
obtained in the investigation is routinely restricted to the
two parties, although the terms of settlement may be
publicized with the consent of both parties "to help the
Commission maximize the voluntary efforts of
organizations and individuals to be fair and nondiscriminatory.''s6
Moreover, it is clear that most complaints do not result
in a formal hearing by a Human Rights Tribunal
established under the Act. By February 1979, only three
tribunals had been announced and none had yet been
established. 57 Interestingly, two of these first three
tribunals were required as a result of claims of
discrimination based on sex and marital status. In one, a
woman complained after a denial of employment .as a
member of the Governor-General s Foot Guards; m the
other a woman complained after she was informed that
1
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she could not claim an income tax deduction for a man
whom she supported and with whom she had lived in a
common law marriage relationship for five years. Both
these cases have potential as precedents affecting many
other women in similar circumstances and both cases
also involve a Department or agency of the federal
government. It is probably significant that in such cases
conciliation has proved unsuccessful; where the rights
of a single individual are concerned, conciliation may be
useful to resolve the problem, but where the issue has
far-reaching consequences for many people, cooperation
from employers, including the federal government, is
less likely. This situation underlines the need for
measures in addition to the complaints process to
eliminate discrimination.
No recommendations for contract compliance were
made by the Commission in 1978. The ANNUAL
REPORT stated 58 that the Commission required
clarification of "the implication and effectiveness" of
s.19 before requesting such regulations. Moreover,
because contractors under provincial jurisdiction must
already comply with the provincial human rights
legislation, s.19 must be implemented in the context of
federal-provincial relations.
Overall, the ANNUAL REPORT of 1978 indicates that
the Commission has established procedures and
initiated the process of complaints-investigation.
However, it is clear that its primary emphasis is on
conciliation, which will affect only the rights of the
individual complainant, and that it has yet to embark on
investigation initiated other than by the victim of
discrimination. Moreover, the Commission has not
exercised its legislative power to recommend contract
compliance, and there are no indications that it will do
so in the near future. 59 However, in view of the large
number of cases pending at the end of 1978, 6° and the
problems of staff allocation encountered, 61 any real
analysis of the Commission in terms of complaints and
compliance must be deferred. It is sufficient to point out
that the present trend appears to be a primary emphasis
on voluntary compliance and conciliation, despite the
existence of legislative provisions which could compel
compliance. In the context of discrimination against
women in the workplace, the continuation of such a
trend is unlikely to produce substantial changes.
(2) Education Programs and Attitudinal Change
The Commission has initiated a number of programs
to increase awareness of human rights issues. In
particular, its efforts in relation to equal pay have great
significance for women workers. In September 1978, the
equal pay guidelines were announced, and the
Commission released information pamphlets outlining
the meaning and application of equal pay. 62 The
Commission has also introduced an Equality in
Employment program which is intended to assist
employers to comply with the Act.6 3 In addition, there
are Special Programs Officers of the Commission
available to improve opportunities for particular groups
or to prevent, reduce or eliminate disadvantages caused
to groups, including women. 64 Special programs may be
introduced voluntarily or as part of a settlement, and the
Commission's goal is to find solutions "that meet the
employer's business needs, avoid complaints of 'reverse
discrimination' and meet the long term objective of
correcting the disadvantages faced by many people." 65
Special programs involving affirmative action could be

very effective in that their impact is on women as a
group rather than just on an individual complainant.
Unfortunately, the ANNUAL REPORT of 1978 contains
too few details of the Equality Employment program or
of Special Programs relating to sex discrimination to
evaluate them properly as means of ensuring equality of
opportunity for working women. As with complaints,
however, it is clear that the primary emphasis of the
Commission is on voluntary compliance achieved by
attitudinal change. In pursuit of this goal, the
Commission published a wide range of literature and
Commission members were very busy during 1978 with
speaking engagements to publicize the work of the
Commission.
In relation to its goal of increasing awareness of
human rights, the Commission has also been active in
monitoring proposed federal legislation. In the context
of discrimination against working women, the
Commission made recommendations on Bill C-14 (An
Act to Amend the Unemployment Insurance Act),
particularly in relation to s.30 and s.46 (which disentitle
pregnant employees to more than fifteen weeks of
maternity benefits despite availability for work during
the early months of pregnancy). 66 The Minister of
Employment and Immigration replied that the proposed
legislation was not discriminatory towards women, and
the Commission has undertaken further studies as a
result of data supplied by the Minister. 67 Subsequently,
in March 1979, the Canadian Advisory Council on the
Status of Women announced its intention to complain
formally to the Commission about a regulation under
the Unemployment Insurance Act which requires an
employee to work at least twenty hours per week to
qualify for benefits under the Act. 68 The regulation
excludes many part-time workers from benefits
coverage, and 71 % of part-time workers are female. 69
Even prior to the complaint, the Commission had been
investigating the impact of the regulation to assess
whether it was "in keeping with the spirit" of the
Canadian Human Rights Act. 70 In so doing, the
Commission was performing a useful monitoring role to
ensure that federal legislation conforms to the
requirements of the Act. Unfortunately, the process
requires long hours of investigation and negotiation,
and to date, the Commission has not been successful in
ensuring implementation of the changes it has
recommended.
In view of the short time-span of the Commission's
work, it is again difficult to form definite conclusions
about its effectiveness in changing attitudes about
women's roles in the workforce. It has engaged in a wide
variety of activities, and designed a number of programs
to extend awareness of the Act's provisions and to assist
voluntary compliance. Although there is little concrete
evidence of change in employment opportunities for
women after one year, it is probably too early to expect
substantial changes as a result of these measures. The
danger is that, even after a number of years, little change
will have occurred. The Commission's emphasis on
voluntary compliance as a result of awareness and
attitudinal change is clear, but only time will indicate the
wisdom of its choice. Despite the validity of a focus on
attitudinal change in combatting some forms of
discrimination, experience elsewhere suggests that more
·direct and compulsory measures are needed to eliminate
discrimination against women who work. As has been
8

demonstrated, the Canadian Human Rights Act
·presents difficulties from a theoretical perspective in
relation to the opportunities for working women.
Moreover, at the end of its first year, it is clear that the
·Commission has yet to take full advantage of all of the
0pportunities presented by the legislation. Within the
context of the legislation, the Commission must reevaluate the focus of its efforts in relation to sex
discrimination in the workplace. Half the population of
Canada deserves a better chance for "social justice", and,

in the Commission's words, "social justice" demands no
less than "social change."71
·
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FOOTNOTES

8. The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing
procedures to be followed by investigators (s.35(4)); and s.35(2)
authorizes investigators to enter any premises or make such
inquiries as are necessary for the investigation of the complaint,
and to require production of any documents relevant to the
investigation.

1. Part II of the Act, which sets up The Canadian Human Rights
Commission and s.57, were proclaimed in force August 10, 1977.
The rest of the Act was proclaimed in force as of March 1, 1978.

2. About 1, 162,323 employees are under the jurisdiction of the
Canadian Human Rights Commission. This is approximately 11 %
of all Canadian employees, and almost half are employees in
industries under federal jurisdiction; the rest are public service
employees, RCMP or Canadian forces members specifically
deemed to be crown employees by s.48(4) of the Act, or employees
in federal government enterprises and agencies. An estimated
32. 6% of these 1, 162, 323 persons are women.

9. S.37(1) provides that the commission may also choose to appoint a
conciliator immediately upon the filing of the complaint.
10. Only three human rights tribunals had been announced as of
February 23, 1979. GLOBE & MAIL 23 February 1979.
11. S.41(3) allows the tribunai to award special punitive
compensation of up to $5000 if the employer has wilfully or
recklessly discriminated or if the victim's feelings or self-respect
have suffered.

For a more detailed breakdown, see "Table 1-Estimated number
of persons who come under the jurisdiction of the Canadian
Human Rights Commission ... "prepared by the Research Branch
of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, May 26, 1978.

12. For a good discussion of the provincial human rights legislation in
existence, see Ian HUNTER, Human Rights Legislation in Canada
(1976), 15 U. W. 0. L. REV. 21.

The Canadian Human Rights Act also applies to areas of the
private sector subject to federal regulation, with the exception of
provisions of the Indian Act; chartered banks; grain elevators;
uranium mines; radio and television stations; some railways and
trucking companies; and airlines. See Canadian Human Rights
Commission, ANNUAL REPORT, March 16, 1979, at 3.

13. Sylvia ROBERTS, "Employment Litigation: A Feminist Viewpoint" (1973), 9TRIAL No. 6, 13.
14. HUNTER supra note 12.

15. Ibid.

3. Marjorie COHEN, The Nation: Human Rights, (1978) 2
ONTARIO REPORT No. 6, 5.

16. In two cases, Hadley v. City of Mississauga (May 21, 1976) and
Cosgrove v. City of North Bay (May 21, 1976), Boards have con-sidered the meaning of bona fide in this context. In both cases, the
Board was required to decide whether a compulsory retirement
age of 60 for firefighters represented discrimination on the basis of
age, or whether the requirement could be justified on the grounds
that a bona fide occupational requirement of the job of firefighting
was being under the age of sixty. The Boards in these cases reached
opposite conclusions on whether age, on the facts, was a bona fide
occupational requirement. Moreover, the Boards used different
reasoning about the interpretation of a bona fide occupational
requirement. In Hadley, the Board stated that each case must be
examined on an individual basis, rather than relying on general or
class concepts, while in Cosgrove, the Board declared that the
practical reality of the work-a-day would and life in general must
support the bona £ides.

4. s.9(3) defines an employee organization as a trade union or other
organization whose purpose is to negotiate the terms of
employment with employers.
5. The Canadian Human Rights Commission, pursuant to ss.11(3)
and 22(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, issued the Equal
Wage Guidelines on September 18, 1978 prescribing the factors
justifying different wages for equal work.
According to the Guidelines, reasonable factors include different
performance ratings where there is a formal appraisal system;
seniority; red-circling (where an employee's position is reevaluated and down-graded and the employee's wages are fixed
until they equal the wages in the down-graded position); a
rehabilitation assignment; a demotion pay procedure; or a
temporary training position.

Cosgrove w~s appealed by the Commission, and the Board's decision was upheld. The court decided that the Board's finding that
the mandatory retirement provision was a BFOR was a finding of
fact. See Re Ontario Human Rights Commission and City of
North Bay (1977), 17 O. R. (2d) 712. Since capacity may be a
different issue with respect to age than it is with respect to sex,
these cases may not be directly relevant to pr?bl~n:s of sex discrimination. However, the need to focus on md1VIdual characteristics rather than those generally ascribed to persons in a particular group may be similar for both the aged and women.

These Guidelines also provide that the skill required, the effort
required, the responsibility and conditions under which an
employee works are to be considered in determining if employees
are performing work of equal value in the same establishment.
6. An example is the Equal Wage Guidelines, referred to supra, fn. 5.
7. However, no complaints may be dealt with unless a) the act or
omission occurred in Canada and the victim was lawfully present
or entitled to be present in Canada, orb) the act occurred outside
Canada but the victim was a Canadian citizen or landed
immigrant or c) there was no identifiable victim. (s.32 (5)). The
latter possibility (s.32(5) (c) recognizes that there may be instances
of discrimination where there is no particular individual
identifiable as a victim who could complain about the unlawful
act.

17. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
18. Supra note 17, s.703.
19. 408 F. 2D 228 (5th Cir. 1969)
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28. See the CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS, SUBMISSION TO
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON BILL C-25.

20. 346 F. SUPP. 645 (D. N. H. 1972)
21. 442F.2D.385 (U.S.C.A. 5thCir.1971)

29. L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION (Harv. U. Press, Boston: 1968).

22. In a leading American case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S.
424 (U.S. S. C. 1970) it was held that there can be discrimination
where there is no difference in the treatment of groups as Jong as
there is a disproportionate impact on a Title VII protected group.
Thus an employment test requiring good scores on an aptitude test
and a high school diploma, where they are not job related, was
held to be discriminatory as it resulted in indirect discrimination
against blacks. However, the effect of this case has been undercut
by a more recent U.S. S. C. decision, General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In that case, female employees were
denied disability benefits for absence due to pregnancy. This was
held to be non-discriminatory despite its disproportionate effect
on women; the Court held that there was a rational basis for distinguishing pregnancy because it is voluntary, unlike other disabilities. In reaching this decision the U. S.S. C. rejected an EEOC
guideline providing that benefits should apply to pregnancy as
well as to other temporary disabilities. This represents a retreat
from the Griggs position and perhaps a trend towards undermining the effect of Title VII. For a more detailed discussion of the
Gilbert case, see Cohen, General Electric Co. v. Cilbert: Comment
(1977), 18 S. T. L.J. 608, Frobes, General Electric v. Gilbert: A
Lesson in Sex Education and Discrimination", [f977] UTAH L. R.
119, Peters, Sex Discrimination-Distinctions Between Title VII
and Equal Protection-General Electric v. Gilbert (1978), 31
RUTGERS LR 91, Ogg, "Title VII-Are Exceptions Swallowing
the Rule?" (1977), 13 TULSA L.J. 102.

30. Further limitations of the complaints mechanism are discussed in
BOHNEN Women Workers in Ontario (1973), 31 U. OFT. FAC.
L. R. 45.
31. ROBERTS, supra note 13.
32. For example, under the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, The
Commission has similar powers to initiate complaints, but has
done so in only 10% of all cases. See Elizabeth LENNON, "Sex
Discrimination in Employment: The Nova Scotia Human Rights
Act", (1976), 2 DAL. L. J, 593.
33. KathleenARCHIBALD,SEXANDTHEPUBLICSERVICE (1970),
discussed in BOHNEN, supra, fn. 30. See also Monica
TOWNSEND, WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE (ASCW: 1977)
which is an analysis of statistics for 1976, using Archibald's
methodology.
34. Linda S. DRANOFF, Women as Lawyers in Toronto (1972), 10
0. H. L. J. 177.
35. Abraham COSTIN, REPORT ON THE SURVEY CONDUCTED
OF GRADUATES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
FACULTY OF LAW (1973, 1974, 1975AND1976), (August 1978),
unpublished.

23. State Division of Human Rights On the Complaint of Bernice
Gera v. New York-Pennsylvania Professional Baseball League 36
A, D. 2d 364, 320 N. Y.S. 2d 788 (S. C. Ap. Div. 4th Dept. 1971)

36. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, EQUALITY
BETWEEN THE SEXES IN INDUSTRY: HOW FAR HAVE WE
COME? (1978), a booklet produced by the Equal Opportunities
Commission, Overseas House, Quay Street, Manchester M3 3HN,
England. See also Anna COOTE, Equality and the Curse of the
Quango, NEW STATESMAN (1December1978) 734.

24. Matter of Berni 40 A. D. 2d 701, 336 N. Y. S. 2d. 620 aff'd. 32
N. Y. 2d 933, 347 N. Y. S. 2d 198 (S. C. Ap. Div. 2nd Dept. 1972).
25. (Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry, 1975) unreported; discussed in
Elizabeth LENNON, Sex Discrimination in Employment: The
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act (1976), 2 DAL. L.J. 593.

37. Id., at 22.
38. Ibid.

26. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, ACSW
RECOMMENDATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
(BILLC-25), 1977.
27. Originally issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, November 22, 1965, the Guidelines on
Discrimination Because·of Sex were reaffirmed by the
Commission on February 21, 1968 (33F. R. 3344), amended on
August 19, 1969 (34 F. R. 13367), and last amended and reissued
on March 30, 1972 (37 F. R. 6835), effective on April 5, 1972. The
Guidelines are codified as Title 29 CFR, Chapter XIV, Part 1604,
Sections 1604.1to1604.10, as amended. The EEOC and the courts
(which have generally followed EEOC guidelines although they
are not bound by them) have recognized five categories for which
an employer claim that sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification is accepted:

39. This investigation and an informal settlement negotiated by the
EEOC with AT & T resulted in back pay for 13,000 women and the
introduction of affirmative action programs. See Jain, infra note
40. The changes cost AT&T between $23 million and $35 million
annually. See Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force
on Women and Employment, EXPLOITATION FROM9 TO 5
(New York, Lexington Books: 1975) at 71.
40. JAIN," Affirmative Action in Practice: A Prototype for Canadian
Action?" (1975) HUMAN RELATIONS 16. A recent illustration
of the sweeping effect of The American law is an October 30, 1978
decision of the U. S. District Court of New Jersey. In that case
brought by K yriaki K yriazi, Western Electric' s Kearny plant was
found to have discriminated against women as a group.
Newspaper advertisements publicizing the decision appeared (i.e.
NEW YORK TIMES, February 4, 1979, 44) inviting women who
may have been discriminated against to file a claim at the "Stage
II" proceedings, at which time the Court would determine the
damages and other relief available to individual women. At these
proceedings any eligible woman will be presumed to have been
discriminated against and entitled to recover unless Western
Electric can rebut the presumption. Clearly this broader-based
approach has a much greater impact than legislation focusing on
the resolution of individual complaints only.

1) where unique sexual characteristics are required for
authenticity or genuineness, e.g. an actress, or undercover police
agent.
2) where a certain sex is required for reasons of propriety or
privacy e.g. locker room attendant.
3) w:here the primary function of a business requires the
employees to have sex appeal e.g. waitress at the Playboy Club.
Thus if the court had found Diaz supra fn. 21, that sex appeal was
required by the airline business and the essence of the business
would be undermined without it, sex would have been held to be
a bona fide occupational qualification.
4)' where sex is important for psychological or psycho-sexual
reasons e.g. male supervisors counselling delinquent boys.
5) in a prison situation, where there is the danger of sexual
assault, women may be excluded from prisoner-contact
positions to avoid security problems.

41. Executive Order 11246, issued in 1965 forbade discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin for federal
contracts. Executive Order 11375, which took effect on October 13,
1968, extended the original order to include discrimination on the
basis of sex. See Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force on Women and Employment, supra, fn. 39, at 103.

For a more detailed discussion of the American legislation and its
effects, see SIR OT A, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification (1976), 55 TEX. L. R. 1025, and
OGG, Title VII: Are Exceptions Swallowing the Rule? (1977), 13
TULSA L. J. 102.

42. There are no punitive damages available under the Canadian
Human Rights Act other than those permitted by s.41(3) (supra at
fn. 11); in general an employer found to be discriminating will
merely be ordered to compensate the victim. The issue of sex
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discrimination is generally regarded as an individual, rather than ·a societal, problem.

Director of Affirmative Action for Employment Canada indicated
that the voluntary program could result in contract compliance in
the future. The announcement did not indicate that this federal
initiative was linked to the legislative authority given to the
Canadian Human Rights Commission in s.19, but informal links
seem both desirable and appropriate. See the TORONTO ST AR,
13 February 1979.

43. Much of the 45% wage gap between male and female workers is
due to the concentration of women in low-paying job ghettoes
rather than the result of unequal pay for equal work
44. CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT 1978 (March 16, 1979), iii.
45. Ibid.

61. The ANNUAL REPORT indicates that many of the staff members
of the Complaints and Compliance Branch were hired and trained
only by the end of 1978. Supra, fn. 44, at 26.

46. Id., at 5.

62. Id., at 12.

47. Ibid.

63. Id., at 13.

48. Id., at 34-35.

64. Id., at 13-14.

49. Ibid.

65. Id., at 14.

50. Ibid.

66. In Bliss v. Attorney-General of Canada, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided that a pregnant employee was entitled only to
fifteen weeks maternity benefits despite the employee's
availability for work and qualification (in the absence of the
pregnancy) for additional benefits. The decision was announced
on 31October1978.

51. Id., at 8.
52. Ibid. Two of the complainants accepted the offers of employment;
the third had already accepted another job.
53. Id., at 8-9. There were also 4 formal complaints under the equal
pay provision (s.11). Id., at 12.

67. Supra, fn. 68, at 23.
68. The TORONTO STAR, 1March1979.

54. Id., at 9.
69. Ibid.
55. Id., at 25.
70. In late February, the Employment and Immigration Department
initiated legal action in the Federal Court to determine whether
the Commission had jurisdiction to investigate its affairs. The
Court ruled in favour of the Commission, but the decision is under
appeal. MONTREAL ST AR, 28 February 1979, and discussions
with Commission Officers, April 1979.

56. Id., at 25-26
57. GLOBE AND MAIL, 23 February 1979.
· 58. Supra, fn. 44, at 18.
59. Interestingly, in March 1979, the federal government announced a
new program of "affirmative action consultants", who will seek
the voluntary participation of crown corporations and private
firms with government contracts worth $200,000 and at least 50
employees in programs to create job opportunities for women,
natives, and the physically handicapped. Elizabeth McAllister, the

71. The Commission's ANNUAL REPORT indicates that its ultimate
objectives are social justice and social change, that is, "the
restoring of rights to those who have been deprived of them by
discrimination; and the improvement of social systems and public
attitudes so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the incidence of
discrimination." Id, at 1.
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